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Abstract	The	current	state	of	the	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	the	philosophy	of	science	might	appear	to	be	one	best	described	as	‘hostility	on	both	sides’.	In	an	attempt	to	bridge	this	gap,	French	and	McKenzie	(2013)	have	suggested	a	two	fold	strategy:	on	the	one	hand,	if	metaphysics	is	to	be	taken	to	have	something	direct	to	say	about	reality,	the	implications	of	physics	need	to	be	properly	appreciated;	on	the	other,	one	does	not	have	to	agree	with	the	claim	that	a	
prioristic	metaphysics	should	be	dismissed	or	even	discontinued,	since	we	should	value	scientifically	disinterested	metaphysics	as	a	‘toolbox’	for	philosophers	of	science.	It	is	in	the	context	of	this	strategy	that	I	want	to	approach	the	issue	of	understanding	the	symmetry	principles	that	feature	in	the	Standard	Model	of	modern	physics.	I	shall	suggest	that	the	dispositional	analysis	of	laws	is	incapable	of	accommodating	such	principles.	However,	there	are	other	tools	in	the	metaphysical	toolbox	that	one	can	draw	upon	to	help	capture	the	nature	of		such	symmetries	corresponding	to	the	second	part	of	the	above	strategy.	
		
Introduction	The	current	state	of	the	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	the	philosophy	of	science	might	appear	to	be	one	best	described	as	‘hostility	on	both	sides’.	Certain	philosophers	of	science	have	dismissed	much	of	current	metaphysics	as	disconnected	from	the	implications	of	modern	science	or	based	on	high-school	chemistry	at	best.	Some	metaphysicians,	for	their	part,	have	insisted	that	their	aim	is	to	explore	the	space	of	the	possible	and	not	to	be	confined	to	the	actual.	In	an	attempt	to	bridge	this	gap,	French	and	McKenzie	(2013)	have	suggested	a	two	fold	strategy:	on	the	one	hand,	if	metaphysics	is	to	be	taken	to	have	something	direct	to	say	about	reality,	the	implications	of	physics	need	to	be	properly	appreciated	and	this	will	have	implications	for	certain	‘paradigmatic’	metaphysical	positions;	on	the	other,	one	does	not	have	to	agree	with	the	claim	that	a	prioristic	metaphysics	should	be	dismissed	or	even	discontinued,	since	various	considerations	suggest	that	we	should	value	scientifically	disinterested	metaphysics	as	a	‘toolbox’	for	philosophers	of	science.		 It	is	in	the	context	of	this	overall	strategy	that	I	want	to	approach	the	issue	of	understanding	the	Standard	Model	of	modern	high-energy	physics.	In	particular,	my	concern	is	how	we	should	understand	the	nature	and	role	of	the	symmetry	principles	that	are	crucial	features	of	this	model.	I	shall	suggest	that	the	standard	dispositional	analysis	of	laws	is	incapable	of	accommodating	such	principles.	In	effect	this	is	to	deploy	the	first	part	of	the	above	two-fold	strategy,	according	to	which	the	implications	of	modern	physics	may	well	rule	out	certain	metaphysical	positions.	However,	there	are	other	tools	in	the	metaphysical	
toolbox	that	one	can	draw	upon	to	help	capture	the	nature	of	symmetries	in	physics,	corresponding	to	the	second	part	of	the	strategy.		
The	Death	of	Dispositionalism	Dispositionalist	and	powers	based	analyses	of	properties	have	extended	their	reach	recently,	from	vases	and	fragility	to	electrons	and	charge.	Thus	Mumford	writes:		‘[p]hysics	in	particular	seems	to	invoke	powers,	forces	and	propensities,	such	as	the	spin,	charge,	mass	and	radioactive	decay	of	subatomic	particles’	(Mumford,	2011:	267).			The	core	idea	is	that	such	fundamental	properties	of	physics	as	spin,	charge	and	mass	can	all	be	understood	in	dispositional	terms,	where	that	involves	the	appropriate	stimulus	yielding	the	relevant	manifestation.	Think	of	charge	for	example:	we	take	a	given	charge	and	bring	up	a	test	charge	to	a	certain	distance,	whereupon	a	certain	force		and	acceleration	is	experienced	(either	towards	or	from	the	given	charge).	The	bringing	up	of	the	test	charge	is	the	stimulus	and	the	force	or	acceleration	experienced	is	the	manifestation.			 On	the	standard	view,	dispositions	can	thus	be	captured	in	terms	of	the	‘Stimulus	and	Manifestation	Characterisation’	(S&M):	
 
∀x((Px	&	S	x)	→	Mx)		where	P	is	the	relevant	property,	such	as	charge,	S	the	stimulus	and	M	the	manifestation.		 This	then	yields	the	corresponding	laws	(see	Bird	2007)	and	one	of	the	core	advantages	of	this	characterisation	is	that	it	explains	the	physical	necessity	of	those	laws:	in	any	possible	world	that	contains	objects	with	property	P,	the	presence	of	the	stimulus	will	yield	the	relevant	manifestation;	hence	in	those	worlds,	the	corresponding	laws	will	hold.			 	
The	Standard	Model	Now,	when	it	comes	to	quantum	physics,	the	fundamental	law	is	given	by	Schrödinger’s	Equation:		
		where	H	denotes	a	specific	Hamiltonian	and	the	ni	denote	the	state-independent	properties	that	identify	the	kind	of	particle	involved.	Of	course,	as	presented	thus	it	is	perfectly	general	and	to	get	something	applicable	to	a	particular	system,	we	need	to	‘plug	in’	the	relevant	Hamiltonian.	To	attribute	a	property	to	a	particle	obeying	one	of	these	specific	laws,	the	operator	for	that	property	must	commute	with	the	corresponding	Hamiltonian.	Sets	of	such	operators	then	form	a	group	representing	a	symmetry	of	the	system.	By	virtue	of	the	requirement	that	these	operators	must	commute	with	the	relevant	Hamiltonian,	the	symmetries	can	be	
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viewed	as	acting	as	constraints	on	particular	Hamiltonians	and	their	associated	specific	laws.			 What	symmetries	are	we	talking	about?	Well,	first	of	all	there	is	the	Permutation	Invariance	that	arises	from	the	so-called	indistinguishability	of	quantum	particles	(see	French	and	Krause	2006).	As	a	constraint	it	effectively	divides	up	the	Hilbert	space	into	non-combining	sectors,	each	corresponding	to	a	particular	irreducible	representation	of	the	permutation	group	and	thus	to	a	certain	kind	of	particle	and	yielding	a	particular	form	of	quantum	statistics,	the	two	most	well	known	being	fermions,	which	obey	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	and	bosons,	obeying	Bose-Einstein	statistics.		 Secondly,	the	underlying	quantum	theory	of	the	Standard	Model	is,	of	course,	quantum	field	theory,	so	the	second	set	of	symmetries	that	needs	to	be	considered	are	those	of	Minkowski	space-time	–	the	space-time	of	Special	Relativity.	These	are	captured	by	the	Poincaré	group	and	the	irreducible	representations	of	this	group	yield	a	classification	of	all	elementary	particles,	with	these	representations	indexed	or	characterised	by	mass	and	spin	(the	invariants	of	the	group).			 Finally,	the	Standard	Model	(SM)	itself	is	fundamentally	a	gauge	theory,	represented	by	the	group	SU(3)	x	SU(2)	x	U(1)	via	which	the	relevant	symmetries	can	be	captured	within	the	theory.	That	the	SM	is	a	gauge	theory	refers	to	the	way	in	which	the	Lagrangian	of	a	system	–	which	basically	captures	the	dynamics	of	that	system	–	remains	invariant	under	a	group	of	transformations,	where	the	‘gauge’	denotes	certain	redundant	degrees	of	freedom	of	that	Lagrangian.	The	generator	of	the	group	of	transformations	represents	a	field	and	when	such	a	field	is	quantised,	we	get	the	so-called	gauge	bosons.	Thus,	consider	electrodynamics,	for	example:	the	relevant	gauge	symmetry	group	associated	with	the	property	of	charge	is	labelled	U(1)	and	the	gauge	boson	that	effectively	drops	out	of	the	requirement	of	gauge	invariance	is	the	familiar	photon.	This	requirement	can	then	be	extended	to	the	other	forces	in	physics	and	so,	for	the	weak	nuclear	force,	we	have	the	SU(2)	symmetry	group	associated	with	isospin,	a	property	of	protons	and	neutrons,	and	the	strong	nuclear	force	associated	with	SU(3)	which	operates	on	the	colour	property	of	quarks.	With	the	Higgs	boson	associated	with	the	breaking	of	the	isospin	symmetry	of	the	unified	electro-weak	force	and	responsible	for	the	acquisition	of	mass,	we	have	a	complete	picture	of	the	fundamental	forces,	gravity	excepting	of	course.			 So,	we	have	the	‘internal’	gauge	symmetries,	the	‘external’	space-time	symmetries	and	Permutation	symmetry.	And	the	blunt	question	for	the	dispositionalist	is:	how	are	you	going	to	accommodate	them?	Frankly,	I	do	not	think	she	can	(for	similar	sentiments,	see	Psillos	1996;	Lange	2012;	and	for	further	discussion	in	this	specific	context	see	Cei	and	French	2014,	French	2014).	Consider	the	S&M	characterisation	above:	how	might	this	accommodate	the	afore-mentioned	symmetry	principles?	It	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	that	it	is	in	response	to	a	certain	kind	of	stimulus	that	a	quantum	particle	manifests	fermionic	or	bosonic	behaviour,	or	cannot	accelerate	past	the	speed	of	light	or	has	its	interactions	governed	by	the	SU(3)	symmetry,	say.	Indeed,	dispositionalists	themselves	seem	to	appreciate	the	difficulty	in	which	they	find	themselves,	with	Bird,	for	example,	suggesting	that	these	symmetries	should	be	dismissed	as	mere	‘pseudo-laws’	that	will	eventually	be	eliminated	from	physics.	
	 One	might	be	tempted	to	shift	to	an	alternative	account,	such	as	the	so-called	‘Humean’	picture.	According	to	this,	the	underlying	metaphysics	is	that	of	a	‘mosaic’	of	properties	(the	so-called	‘perfectly	natural’	ones)	instantiated	at	space-time	points.	This	mosaic	exhibits	certain	regularities	and	those	that	we	represent	via	our	‘best’	system	are	deemed	to	be	laws	(see	Cohen	and	Callender	2009).	However,	little,	if	anything,	has	been	said	on	how	the	Humean	might	accommodate	the	above	symmetry	principles.			 Here	a	dilemma	arises	(see	Hall	2015)	:	first,	this	combination,	of	the	Humean	mosaic	with	its	regularities,	and	a	‘best	system	account’	of	laws	(plus	symmetries)	just	does	not	mesh	nicely	with	the	practice	of	physics.	In	particular,	that	practice	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	what	can	be	called	the	‘Dynamical	Hypothesis’	(DH)	and	the	‘Initial	Conditions	Hypothesis’	(ICH),	into	which	the	nomologically	possible	histories	of	particle	behaviour	are	factored	by	the	fundamental	laws	(ibid.).	Our	system	will	then	be	better	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	is	as	uninformative	as	possible,	in	the	sense	that	it	should	admit	as	broad	a	range	of	initial	conditions	as	nomologically	permitted,	whereas	the	former	should	be	as	informative	as	possible,	this	combination	yielding	the	maximum	explanatory	power.			 Unfortunately,	this	distinction	is	entirely	unmotivated	by	the	underlying	metaphysics	of	the	Humean	mosaic	(ibid.).	To	see	this,	consider	the	Humean	conception	of	law:	on	this	view,	a	claim	about	the	world	counts	as	law-like	only	if	it	can	be	regarded	as	a	‘distinctively	appropriate	target	for	scientific	inquiry’,	independent	of	its	nomological	status.	The	question	then	is,	how,	from	all	the	various	distributions	of	perfectly	natural	properties	spread	across	the	mosaic,	do	we	pick	out	those	that	count	as	‘distinctively	appropriate’?	Lewis,	famously,	argued	that	we	should	pick	out	those	that	meet	certain	standards	of	simplicity	and	informativeness,	but	the	latter,	is	precisely	not	what	we	want	when	it	comes	to	the	ICH.			 Thus,	the	Humean	faces	a	dilemma:	on	the	one	hand,	she	can	ensure	that	her	account	meshes	with	the	practice	of	physics	by	incorporating	the	ICH/DH	distinction,	but	then	the	choice	of	the	resulting	standards	(for	judging	what	is	a	law	etc.)	are	entirely	unmotivated	by	the	metaphysics	of	the	mosaic;	or	she	can	choose	standards	that	are	so	motivated,	but	then	her	account	will	be	out	of	kilter	with	scientific	practice.	As	Hall	puts	it,		‘This	choice	between	a	guilty	intellectual	conscience	and	insane	revisionism	is	not	a	happy	one.’	(ibid.,	p.	51).		 Bringing	symmetries	on	stage	renders	this	dilemma	even	more	acute.	The	practice	of	physics	suggests	that	symmetry	principles	should	be	regarded	as	further	constraints	on	the	DH:	in	the	relativistic	context,	for	example,	only	those	dynamical	hypotheses	are	allowed	that	conform	to	the	symmetries	represented	by	the	Poincaré	group;	in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics,	only	those	Hamiltonians	will	be	considered	that	commute	with	the	particle	permutation	operator.	Thus,	in	addition	to	those	restrictions	on	the	ICH	that	would	allow	us,	for	example,	to	construct	a	mathematically	acceptable	DH	to	begin	with,	we	have	the	further	restrictions	imposed	on	the	DH	by	the	relevant	symmetries.	Again,	we	face	the	issue	of	how	these	restrictions	might	be	motivated	by	the	metaphysics	of	the	mosaic.		 The	Humean	could	argue	that	we	should	consider	the	nature	of	physics	practice	more	carefully.	Of	course,	it	would	be	hard	to	deny	that	such	symmetry	principles	do	play	a	heuristic	role	in	theory	construction	but	this	does	not	mean	
that	they	should	be	understood	as	constraining	the	DH	in	the	way	that	the	ICH	does.	Indeed,	the	Humean	can	simply	insist	that	these	symmetries	reflect	meta-level	regularities	that	hold	between	the	law-like	regularities	across	the	mosaic.	Thus,	the	Poincaré	symmetries	are	just	meta-level	features	of	the	laws	of	Special	Relativity	and	Permutation	Symmetry	can	be	understood	as	a	manifestation	of	the	peculiar	nature	of	the	entities	of	which	the	mosaic	is	composed	(French	and	Krause	2006).			 On	this	view,	then,	there	are	no	constraints,	strictly	speaking,	And	to	suggest	that	the	only	alternative	is	to	regard	these	principles	as	‘mere’	coincidences,	would	be	to	miss	the	point:	as	far	as	the	Humean	is	concerned,	that	the	mosaic	displays	certain	regularities	and	that	these	regularities	display	certain	similarities	themselves,	is	just	a	fact	of	the	way	the	world	is.	Of	course,	the	accompanying	‘best	system	account’	must	be	further	extended	to	include	these	symmetries	as	also	part	of	the	‘system’	but	now	Hall’s	dilemma	bites	again.		 One	might	think	that	there	is	nothing	in	principle	preventing	such	an	extension:	those	meta-regularities	that	meet	whatever	criteria	are	deployed	to	evaluate	which	system	is	‘the	best’	are	deemed	to	be	the	symmetry	principles.	However,	on	the	very	basis	just	set	out,	a	claim	about	the	world	counts	as	a	‘meta-regularity’,	in	this	sense,	only	if	it	too	can	be	regarded	as	a	‘distinctively	appropriate	target	for	scientific	inquiry’,	independently	of	its	meta-law-like	status.	But	what	criteria	do	we	use	for	determining	which	of	the	various	meta-regularities	spread	across	the	mosaic	are	deemed	to	be	‘distinctively	appropriate’	in	this	sense?	Granted,	since	we	are	reconstruing	scientific	practice	in	accordance	with	this	response,	we	don’t	have	to	worry	about	accommodating	the	way	physics	views	the	ICH/DH	distinction,	and	so	the	Humean	might,	for	example,	revert	to	the	kind	of	traditional	criteria	that	Hall	dismissed	as	failing	to	mesh	with	that	practice;	criteria	such	as	‘informativeness’	or	explanatory	power.	But	the	extent	to	which	symmetry	principles	might	be	taken	to	possess	such	power	is	only	just	being	explored	and	certainly	further	work	needs	to	be	undertaken	before	pursuing	this	line.		 Hall	concludes	his	analysis	by	asking	what	metaphysical	viewpoint	might	motivate	the	kind	of	distinction	he	has	set	out	between	the	ICH	and	the	DH	and	suggests	that	it	must	be	the	kind	of	view	that	takes	information	about	the	counterfactual	structure	of	the	world	to	be	sui	generis	(Hall	ibid.,	p.52).	With	dispositionalism	ruled	out	by	contemporary	physics,	what	other	view	can	meet	this	demand?		
New	Tools	from	the	Toolbox	There	are	in	fact	a	number	of	recent	analyses	that	one	might	deploy	here,	some	of	which	are	extensions	or	variants	of	the	dispositionalist	framework,	others	of	which	are	quite	different	(French	forthcoming).	Here	is	one	such:	Vetter’s	account	of	potentiality	(Vetter	2015).			 She	begins	by	noting	that	the	conditional	analysis	that	lies	behind	the	S&M	characterisation	of	dispositionality	lies	in	tension	with	our	linguistic	means	by	which	we	ascribe	dispositions,	via	adjectives	such	as	‘fragile’,	‘irascible’,	or	‘soluble’.	As	she	notes,	these	all	refer	to	only	one	half	of	the	putative	conditional,	namely	the	relevant	manifestation	in	each	case.	Furthermore,	she	argues,	the	most	natural	way	of	paraphrasing	for	the	–le	suffix	through	which	they	are	
formed	is	‘can’	and	other	expressions	of	possibility.	This	motivates	her	account,	which	characterises	the	relevant	modality	via	a	form	of	possibility.			 More	particularly,	such	a	possibility	is	a	potentiality	of	some	object,	where	this	is	individuated	by	its	manifestation.	Thus	we	drop	the	stimulus	and	with	it,	the	S&M	characterisation.	The	modal	nature	of	the	possibility	is	then	best	expressed	simply	by	‘x	can	M’		and	the	difference	with	the	dispositional	account	can	be	seen	if	we	consider	the	context-dependence	and	vagueness	of	terms	such	as	‘fragile’.	This	context	dependence	comes	down	to	the	degrees	of	fragility,	in	the	sense	that	whether	something	–	a	vase,	say	–	counts	as	fragile	in	a	given	context	has	to	do	with	how	fragile	it	is.	The	dispositionalist	will	accommodate	that	dependence	in	terms	of	a	property	that	comes	in	degrees,	some	of	which	will	be	sufficient	for	the	correct	application	of	‘is	fragile’.		For	Vetter,	by	contrast,	being	fragile	is	a	matter	of	having	the	right	potentiality	to	a	contextually	sufficient	degree	(ibid.,	pp.	21-22).			 Of	course,	we	lose	the	counterfactual	analysis	underpinning	the	standard	dispositionalist	account,	and	we	lose	the	tight	connection	with	causation.	But	then,	of	course,	the	latter	is	a	problem	when	it	comes	to	the	foundations	of	physics.	We	also	lose	the	explanatory	value	of	dispositionalism	in	accounting	for	the	modal	necessity	of	laws	but	Vetter	argues	that	this	was	always	illusory,	since	all	that	the	S&M	characterisation	gives	us	is	a	conjunction	of	law	instances,	rather	than	the	law	per	se	(Vetter	2009).			 On	her	view,	it	is	potentialities	‘all	the	way	down’,	so	that	the	fundamental	properties	are	potentialities,	possessed,	due	to	their	fundamentality,	to	the	maximum	degree	(2015,	p.	285).	Taking	classical	physics,	on	this	view	objects	that	have	charge	have	the	potentiality	(to	maximal	degree)	to	exert	a	force	whose	value	is	related	to	that	of	other	charges	and	their	distance	from	that	object	through	Coulomb’s	Law	(ibid.).	This	leaves	open	questions	about	the	modal	status	of	such	laws,	in	the	sense	that	their	necessity	or	otherwise	does	not	simply	follow	from	the	modal	metaphysics	of	potentiality		(ibid.,	pp.	288-290).	This	might	seem	like	a	significant	loss	of	metaphysical	explanatory	power	but,	again,	this	was	never	really	there	to	begin	with	and	as	we	have	seen,	cannot	be	obtained	anyway	when	it	comes	to	the	symmetries.	So,	perhaps	we	can	turn	this	to	our	advantage	and	use	Vetter’s	account	to	capture	the	modal	aspects	of	the	Standard	Model.		 Of	course,	we	do	not	have	the	equivalent	in	the	language	of	physics	of	adjectives	such	as	fragile;	we	do	not	(typically)	refer	to	electrons	as	‘spinnable’,	for	example!	However	we	do	have	something	similar,	namely	the	language	of	mathematics,	in	which	modern	physics	is	expressed	(suitably	interpreted	of	course).	It	is	this	that	reveals	the	possibilities	inherent	in	the	particular	symmetry	we	might	be	concerned	with.	Thus,	consider	again	Permutation	Symmetry:	if	one	reads	the	standard	range	of	textbooks	in	quantum	physics,	one	will	find	statements	to	the	effect	that	the	wave	functions	of	quantum	systems	must	be	either	symmetrical	or	anti-symmetrical,	corresponding	to	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	resepctively.	But	as	was	recognised	early	on,	and	as	was	made	explicit	in	the	late	1950s	and	1960s	(for	a	history	of	such	developments,	see	French	and	Krause	2006)	,	the	mathematics	of	the	more	general	Permutation	Invariance	contains	a	whole	range	of	other	possible	
statistics	including	so-called	‘paraparticle’	and	‘infinite’	statistics1.	Likewise,	if	one	considers	spaces	of	dimension	less	than	3,	one	can	obtain	non-standard	‘anyon’	statistics	as	described	by	the	‘braid’	group	(see	French	2000)	and	which	play	an	important	role	in	the	explanation	of	the	fractional	quantum	Hall	effect2.			 And	of	course,	we	don’t	have	the	‘gradability’	or	contextuality	that	are	associated	with	claims	such	as	‘the	vase	is	fragile’	but	we	obviously	do	have	a	different	range	of	possibilities	afforded	by	different	symmetries:	in	addition	to	the	above,	there	is	the	afore-mentioned	range	of	particle	properties,	including	mass	and	spin,	in	the	case	of	Poincaré	symmetry.	Furthermore,	the	different	possibilities	encoded	in	these	principles	–	e.g	as	we	move	from	‘standard’	quantum	statistics	to	the	paraparticle	form	–		correspond	to	counterfactual	scenarios	that	allow	us	to	account	for	the	explanatory	role	of	such	symmetries	(see	French	and	Saatsi	forthcoming).			 Furthermore,	the	simple	Vetter	formula	for	accommodating	potentiality	via	‘x	can	M’	,	where	M	is	the	manifestation	of	this	potentiality,	can	also	be	adapted	to	this	purpose.	Take	‘x’	to	be	the	relevant	symmetry,	then	the	manifestation	will	be	the	property	of	spin,	say,	in	the	case	of	Poincaré	symmetry	or	that	of	being	a	boson,	fermion,	paraparticle	or	anyon	in	the	case	of	Permutation	Invariance.	Eliminating	stimuli	from	this	account	enables	us	to	at	least	begin	to	accommodate	the	modal	features	of	such	principles	without	having	to	unreasonably	contort	the	physics.	In	addition,	we	can	accommodate	Vetter’s	distinction	between	‘mere’	possibility	and	potentiality	in	terms	of	the	latter	standing	to	the	former	as	essence	stands	to	necessity,	namely	as	the	‘localized	counterpart	of	a	non-localized	modality’	(Vetter	2014,	p.	23).	Again	take	Permutation	Invariance:	the	full	range	of	mathematical	possibilities	encoded	here	corresponds	to	all	the	representations	of	the	permutation	group,	but	only	the	symmetric	and	antisymmetric	are	manifested	in	this,	the	actual,	world3.	That	full	range	of	mathematical	structures	can	be	viewed	as	the	‘non-localized’	possibility	and	the	specific	representations	that	apply	to	the	world	can	be	understood	as	the	localized	counterparts.			 Of	course,	this	simplistic	equation	between	possibility	as	abstract	and	potential	as	concrete	may	raise	concerns	in	this	specific	context,	namely	that	here	modality	is	being	reduced	to	the	mathematical;	or	more	acutely,	perhaps,	that	physical	possibility	is	being	reduced	to	mathematical	possibility.	However,	I	see	this	as	a	virtue	rather	than	a	vice!	Leaving	aside	the	tricky	issue	of	how	we	might	distinguish	the	physical	from	the	mathematical,	this	way	of	viewing	things	makes	explicit	the	role	of	surplus	structure	in	the	history	of	modern	physics	as	a	form	of	drawing	upon	further	possibilities	and	making	manifest	the	underlying																																																									1	As	is	now	well-known,	it	was	suggested	that	quarks	obey	a	form	of	the	latter,	before	it	was	shown	that	their	statistical	behaviour	could	be	equally	well	represented	via	the	introduction	of	a	further	parameter	that	came	to	be	called	‘colour’.	The	speculation	that	the	choice	between	applying	parastatistics	and	introducing	a	new	property	is	in	certain	respects	conventional	has	been	firmed	up	by	Baker	et.	al.	2015.	This	might	be	viewed	as	adding	further	heft	to	the	Vetterian	approach.		2	There	is	some	debate	as	to	whether	anyons	should	be	considered	mere	mathematical	artefacts	or	‘real’	and	possibly	manipulable	entities.	In	view	of	what	I	shall	say	below,	one	might	question	this	distinction.		3	Although	if	one	accepts	Baker	et.	al.’s	result	that	there	is	a	certain	conventionality	that	holds	between	conceiving	of	quarks	as	parafermions	of	order	3	and	as	possessing	colour,	then	one	might	suggest	that	other	representations	are	in	fact	manifested	in	this	world	as	well.		
modality.	Again,	the	irreducible	representations	of	the	Permutation	Group	corresponding	to	parafermionic	statistics	are	just	so	much	surplus	structure,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	standard	bosonic	and	fermionic	forms,	but	become	physically	manifest	when	applied	to	quark	statistics.	Ditto	the	representations	of	the	braid	group	underpinning	anyon	statistics.			 One	might	still	balk	at	this	apparent	shift	of	the	locus	of	potentiality	from	objects	–	as	Vetter	emphasises	–	to	certain	principles,	even	if	the	latter	are	regarded	as	‘meta-laws’,	in	some	sense,	with	associated	notions	of	(meta)	governance.	However,	one	could	retain	objects	as	elements	of	one’s	metaphysical	pantheon	and	still	pack	all	the	relevant	potentiality	into	the	symmetries.	Thus,	one	could,	for	example,	give	up	a	substantival	understanding	of	such	objects	(Paul	2013)	and	accept	them	as	bundles	of	properties	and,	crucially,	relations	(Chakravartty	2007),	where	the	latter,	in	turn,	are	seen	as	the	concrete	exemplifications	of	what	we	call	laws	and	symmetries	–	so	the	idea	would	be	akin	to	Humeanism	in	the	sense	that	these	laws	and	symmetries	do	not	govern	the	behaviour	of	the	objects,	in	the	sense	of	being	imposed	upon	them,	but	are	simply	the	descriptions	(within	our	‘best’	system)	of	certain	regularities	and	regularities	between	regularities	that	hold	across	the	distribution	of	objects,	their	properties	and	relations.	Of	course,	such	relations	would	still	embody	the	relevant	modal	features,	so	in	that	sense	this	picture	is	certainly	not	Humean	in	flavour,	and	one	still	has	to	explicitly	address	the	Hall	problem	outlined	above,	but	this	may	be	one	way	to	go	if	one	wishes	to	retain	objects.		 Alternatively	one	can	give	them	up,	either	entirely	or	as	anything	other	than	formal	or	conceptual	placeholders,	of	a	delicate	metaphysical	thinness.	That	way	leads	to	structuralism,	of	either	an	eliminativist	or	‘moderate’	variety,	with	the	modally	informed	symmetries	understood	as	metaphysically	fundamental.	In	a	sense	this	too	offers	a	third	way	between	dispositionalism	and	Humeanism	as	unlike	the	latter	it	retains	the	modal	features	but	unlike	the	former	it	shifts	metaphysical	attention	away	from	putative	objects	as	particulars.	However,	that	has	been	discussed	elsewhere	and	the	considerations	presented	above	can	be	seen	as	a	further	addendum	to	that	discussion	(see	French	2014,	where	the	focus	is	on	the	determinable-determinate	distinction	as	a	metaphysical	tool	used	to	help	explicate	the	relationship	between	symmetries	and	properties).			
The	Thinness	of	the	Tools	There	are	two	further	concerns	that	may	also	arise	about	this	use	of	metaphysical	devices,	such	as	Vetter’s	notion	of	potentiality,	as	tools	in	this	context.	The	first	is	that	they	are	too	‘thin’	or	insubstantial	to	properly	serve	as	tools	in	this	sense,	since	all	the	work	is	effectively	done	by	the	relevant	physics.	Consider	again	Vetter’s	idea	that	modality	can	be	captured	via	the	formula	‘x	can	
M’.	For	this	to	even	begin	to	get	a	grip	on	the	job,	it	needs	to	be	supplemented	with	x	understood	as	the	relevant	symmetry	and	M	as	the	manifestation,	whether	properties	or	kinds	or	whatever.	The	formula	itself	and	the	attendant	understanding	in	terms	of	localization,	contextuality	and	all	the	rest,	seem	to	do	little,	if	any,	of	the	actual	‘work’,	however	that	is	understood.			 But	then	what	did	we	expect?	Insofar	as	‘spin’	drops	out	of	the	Poincaré	group	or	Bose-Einstein	statistics	from	Permutation	Invariance,	all	the	deductive	work	is	being	doing	by	the	relevant	mathematics.	Of	course	it	is	–	how	could	it	be	otherwise?	First	of	all,	so-called	aprioristic	metaphysics	–	that	is	metaphysics	
that	is	not	already	associated	with	science	in	some	form	–	is	standardly	dismissed	as	doing	no	‘work’	(McLaurin	and	Dyke	2012).	Given	that	this	is	the	kind	of	metaphysics	that	French	and	McKenzie	claim	can	yet	be	drawn	upon	as	a	tool,	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that,	given	its	non-naturalistic	nature,	when	used	as	such	it	has	to	be	supplemented	with	the	relevant	physics.	Naturalistic	or	non-analytic	metaphysics	presumably	has	the	relevant	physics	–	or	some	other	science	–	already	‘built	in’.			 Secondly,	as	supplemented,	this	metaphysics-as-tool	nevertheless	yields	something	important,	namely	a	form	of	(metaphysical)	understanding,	which	may	be	regarded	as	a	kind	of	metaphysical	unification.	Consider	again:	our	core	issue	was	how	to	understand	what	appeared	to	be	prima	facie,	certain	modal	features	of	the	Standard	Model	and	modern	physics	more	generally.	Accommodating	these	within	the	standard	dispositionalist	framework	with	its	S&M	characterisation	just	isn’t	an	option,	bluntly	because	we	can’t	make	sense	of	that	characterisation	in	this	context.	Giving	up	on	modality	altogether	and	going	Humean	also	seems	a	dead	end,	given	Hall’s	problem.	Vetter’s	potentiality	offers	us	a	metaphysical	device	that	we	may	adapt	to	our	circumstances	and	by	doing	so	relate	them	to	the	‘everyday’	circumstances	of	vases	and	the	like.	Of	course	there	are	differences	but	the	deployment	of	such	a	tool	helps	to	illustrate	possible	metaphysical	similarities,	thereby	offering	the	hope	of	understanding	the	nature	of	modality	in	the	context	of	modern	physics	by	relating	it	to	the	way	modality	works	in	ordinary	language.			 Now	perhaps,	on	further	analysis,	this	just	won’t	work.	Maybe	in	that	case	we	have	to	go	au	naturel	and	develop	an	appropriate	naturalistic	metaphysics	fit	for	purpose.	But	designing	such	a	bespoke	metaphysics	is	no	easy	task	and	by	virtue	of	its	very	nature	–	that	is,	its	not	being	tied	to	any	metaphysics	of	the	everyday,	even	in	the	thin	sense	as	indicated	above	–	may	undermine	the	possibility	of	understanding.	Consider,	as	a	warning,	Eddington’s	last	great	work,	entitled	Fundamental	Theory,	in	which	he	attempted	to	articulate	what	was	effectively	a	form	of	quantum	gravity	in	his	own	(physical	and	broadly	metaphysical)	terms,	where	those	terms	prove	to	be	almost	impenetrable	to	everyone	else.			
Relieving	the	Tension	There	is	a	further	concern:	if	such	metaphysics	does	prove	useful	as	a	‘tool’,	do	philosophers	of	science	then	have	any	grounds	for	castigating	or	admonishing	or,	generally,	wagging	their	fingers	at	metaphysicians	who	appeal	to	their	intuitions,	or	classical	or	even	Aristotelian,	physics	or	who	ignore	or	pay	little	attention	to	science	in	general?	An	obvious	tension	arises	between	the	two	sides	of	the	French-McKenzie	position	(see	French	and	McKenzie	2015).	There	is,	however,	a	response	that	eases	this	tension:		 What	the	afore-mentioned	anti-metaphysical	philosophers	of	science	are	objecting	to	is	the	filling	in	of	certain	conceptual	frameworks	with	intuitions,	classical	conceptions	or,	more	generally,	an	inadequate	understanding	of	physics.	That’s	where	point	1)	above	of	the	French	and	McKenzie	response	bites,	But	qua	frameworks,	such	devices	and	moves	may	still	prove	useful	tools	as	the	example	of	‘potentiality’	suggests.	That’s	what	lies	behind	point	2).	The	filling	in,	or	supplementing,	is	then	undertaken	by	the	relevant	physics,	as	indicated	above.		
	 The	role	of	metaphysics	as	a	tool	is	then	doubly	conditional:		first,	upon	naturalistic	metaphysicians	and	philosophers	of	science	continuing	to	take	metaphysics	down	‘off	the	shelf’,	instead	of	making	metaphysics	to	order	by	themselves;	and,	secondly,	upon	those	analytical	constructions	actually	turning	out	to	be	relevant	and	useful	to	the	interpretation	of	science	as	it	evolves.	In	both	cases,	this	will	all	be	dependent	on	developments	not	only	in	science	but	also	in	philosophy	of	science.	As	things	stand	however,	and	at	the	very	least,	there	remains	the	possibility	(ha	ha)	of	metaphysics	remaining	useful	for	modern	physics.					
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